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Executive Summary 
Safe Families for Children originated in Chicago, Illinois, in 2003, an innovation of the 
Christian charity: Lydia Homes. It provides vulnerable families with 3 types of family 
support: respite for the children to live away from home for short periods; friendship for 
the main carer, usually the birth mother; and resources to help make the family home a 
healthy environment for children. All 3 family supports are provided by volunteers 
recruited from the Christian church. The programme has spread to several U.S. states.  
In 2013, businessman and philanthropist Peter Vardy, and the CEO of the Vardy 
Foundation, Keith Danby, started a charity with the aim of bringing Safe Families to the 
majority of English local authorities, starting in the North-East of England.  
Safe Families was introduced to Dartington Social Research Unit (DSRU) in 2014, 
leading to rapid analysis of its potential. It was claimed that the U.S. model of Safe 
Families diverted children away from state sponsored foster and residential care. The 
previous evidence for this claim is mixed and difficult to verify, given the differences 
between U.S. and English child welfare systems. Early evidence from the programme in 
England suggested that it had the potential to support many vulnerable families at low 
cost, including a significant proportion of those children that were on the edge of the care 
system. This early evidence also found that:  
 the programme did not evangelise on behalf of the Christian church 
 the initial transfer of the programme from the U.S. to the North-East of England 
had realised a steady stream of volunteers 
 the programme fitted well with local government’s need to forge new relationships 
between public services and civil society 
 the real benefit to local authorities would be in the potential to reduce the flow of 
children into foster and residential care 
 the programme was scalable.  
Using the support from the Department for Education’s Innovation Fund, DSRU and Safe 
Families collaborated to develop and scale the programme. Five innovations emerged 
from this work. First, the programme would focus on 2 categories of children: those in 
need of what local authorities call ‘early help’ (Category 1) and those on the edge of care 
(Category 2). The goals were to reach 15% of the children aged 0-10 years of age 
coming into care and to reduce the overall flow into care by 10% in each user authority. 
Second, the effectiveness of the programme would be boosted by it arriving just in time 
to stem the crisis that led carers to seek support from local children’s services and not, as 
typically happens, several weeks later. Third, using the classic Rogers’ scale strategy, it 
was planned to introduce the programme to 16% (n=24) of the 150 English local 
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authorities within 12 months, using evidence and user recommendation to pull in the 
other 84% of authorities. Fourth, in line with DSRU’s traditions, it was decided to subject 
the intervention to rigorous evaluation, to estimate impact on flows of children into care; 
birth parent outcomes; child outcomes; volunteer and user satisfaction. Armed with 
rigorous evaluation, we were able to trial a new financial model for introducing innovation 
at scale, called a Public Social Partnership (PSP). Fifth, we introduced seminars on the 
management of system dynamics to help participating local authorities reap the full 
benefits of children diverted from the care system.  
This report, which covers the period January 2015 to March 2016 seeks to answer 3 
primary and 2 secondary research questions:  
 does Safe Families divert the flow of children into foster and residential care by 
10%? 
 is there any evidence of increased stress on birth parents or other primary carers 
whose children are supported by Safe Families? 
 is there any evidence of impairment to the well-being of children supported by 
Safe Families? 
 does Safe Families reach needy families in a timely manner? 
 is the programme scaling in line with the Rogers’ strategy described above?  
Methodology 
The team from DSRU used a mixed methods approach. This included scrutiny of 
administrative records on 569 children in need and on the edge of care, in 20 local 
authorities. Of these 569, 91 children from 83 families met the Safe Families referral 
criteria as seeking Category 2 help. Previous years’ administrative data provided a 
comparison. Additional bespoke data was assembled on behalf of several local 
authorities on request. Interviews were held with 15 birth parents and volunteers 
and 10 local authority staff. Five seminars with Safe Families staff were held. A 
randomized control trial was implemented with 26 of the 91 children to evaluate the 
project’s impact on children on the edge of care, but there were insufficient cases for 
findings to be more than indicative. For those families, 3 scales were completed: 
Strengths and Difficulties Questionnaire (SDQ); the Hospital Anxiety and Depression 
Scale (HADS), focused on parent’s stress and depression; and the Interpersonal Support 
Evaluation List (ISEL), focused on the amount of support available to carers.  
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Findings  
Safe Families provided support to 192 families, comprising 480 children in families 
designated as Category 1: early help or family support cases. Although these children 
were not deemed to be ‘on the edge of care’, Safe Families support nevertheless 
included the provision of 218 nights of respite care across this group of children 
There were fewer children in Category 2 (edge of care) referred than initally anticipated. 
In total during the period of the evaluation, 83 families with such children were referred. 
Of these, 40 families comprising 91 children received support from Safe Families 
When the evaluation team looked at a cohort of children entering care under Section 20 
of the Children Act 1989, 15% had a profile that was suitable for the type of help that 
Safe Families provided. The legal grounds for using Safe Families as an alternative to 
Section 20 was established during the evaluation period. However, the potential to divert 
children from care is not being realised evenly across all user local authorities. Many 
children identified by Safe Families as ‘edge of care’ were not those likely to have gone 
into care had they not been involved in the project. Rather, they were those needing early 
help. The uneven, and slower than anticipated, application of Safe Families to children on 
the edge of care can likely be attributed to 3 causes: 
 the time it takes local authorities and practitioners to build up confidence in an 
untested innovation 
 the difficulty of matching the innovation to the right families, and in a timely way  
 a nervousness on the part of some Safe Families staff in managing more serious 
cases. The time taken to match families meeting eligibility criteria to Safe Families 
volunteers reduced markedly in the evaluation phase but, in most cases, remains 
too long to effectively respond to the stress experienced by the primary carer  
DSRU offered advice to all user local authorities on managing system dynamics, so they 
could fully reap the benefits of any children diverted from foster or residential care by 
Safe Families. This advice was taken up by less than half of the local authorities and, as 
far as can be gauged, not yet applied in any.  
The RCT has not been able to provide strong evidence on the impact of the innovation 
due to the low numbers of families with children on the edge of care who received 
support from Safe Families during the evaluation period. Of the 83 families referred for 
such support, only 26 met the criteria for entry into the RCT and were willing to 
participate in the study. Of the 26 families, 13 families were randomised to receive 
support from Safe Families and 13 allocated to the comparison group. Unfortunately, 
findings from this size of trial can only be viewed as indicative.  
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However, whilst acknowledging the above limitation, the evaluation found that , no 
children in the intervention group entered care in the 6 month follow up period, (2 from 
the control group entered care and one was placed under a Special Guardianship Order). 
This suggests that Safe Families can divert cases away from the social care system. 
Data from the parental stress rating scales, SDQs, and inerviews suggest that Safe 
Families volunteers can provide suitable support; that no harm had resulted to children, 
and the stress levels of carers had not increased as a result of the innovation. The focus 
on child protection was strong, and continued to improve. Carers and children supported 
by Safe Families as an alternative to coming into care appeared to be satisfied, although 
numbers were too low to draw any reliable findings.  
Safe Families has been successful at scaling the innovation, and in getting it embedded 
in 20 (14%) of the 150 English local authorities within a 12 month period. All 20 local 
authorities committed funds for Safe Families before evaluation results for the Public 
Social Partnership were available. As predicted by the initial scale strategy, consumer 
satisfaction among the 20 users is creating pull from other groups of local authorities, and 
Safe Families is extending the programme to 3 new local authorities on the South Coast 
and is exploring 2 new regions to start in the 2017/18 financial year.1 
As welcome as this expansion may be, there is much unsupported need within the 3 
regions covered by Safe Families meaning that local authorities not yet signed up in 
those regions could benefit from the innovation, and more children within existing user 
authorities could be diverted from care, justifying expanding the use of the innovation by 
those authorities.  
Remarkably, and unusually for volunteer-based innovations, Safe Families has 
stimulated a steady flow of people from the community willing to give their time to do 
what others have been paid for, and satisfaction levels among volunteers remains strong.  
Lessons learned for stakeholders  
Although limited in scope, this evaluation indicates important learning for several 
stakeholders in the fight to improve the lives of children in need in the U.K.  
                                            
 
1 At the time of writing (January 2017) Safe Families expected to be providing services in 29 local 
authorities with over 3300 volunteers, and to deliver double the volume of service in 2017 compared with 
2016.  
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Learning for Safe Families  
 The future of Safe Families depends on its ability to continue to support more 
children who otherwise would have been drawn into the foster care system.    
 Priority should be given to expanding existing hubs of Safe Families activity over 
developing new hubs.    
 The success of Safe Families, like any innovation for children on the edge of care, 
will depend on effective matching between support offered to families and the 
needs of those families.    
 Momentum behind existing efforts to apply learning about volunteer recruitment to 
non-Christian and non-faith groups should increase.    
Learning for Local Authorities    
 It is tempting to treat children in the different sub-systems of children’s services as 
homogenous, by virtue of their label, such as child in care or child in need of 
protection. Services can be much better differentiated if these groups are 
disaggregated by pattern of need.  
 There is an alarming loss of knowledge about system dynamics; the management 
of numbers of children in care, and the consequences of effective innovation on 
those numbers. Knowledge accumulated in the last decades of the last century will 
aid progress.    
 Civil society contains huge tapped and untapped resrouces for families in need. 
Many children who are exposed to risks that may impair their health or 
development are not known to the public system. Evidence suggests that those 
formally designated as ‘children in need’ are likely only a small proportion of this 
total (DSRU, forthcoming). The experience of Safe Families suggests that there 
are many people in civil society ready to volunteer for unpaid roles that have 
traditionally been paid for by public systems.  
Learning for Government  
 There is a growing, and understandable, concern about the rising rates of children 
in care, expressed, for example, by the President of the ADCS and the President 
of the Family Division of the High Court. Central government can back innovation 
in this area by sharing risks taken by public systems and charitable start-ups.  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 Much evidence regarding children in care is alarmingly out of date, and there is 
limited evidence about impact on outcomes. As an intrusive and costly intervention 
in family life, there is an ethical imperative to determine its effect. 
 There is a loss of knowledge about the origins and aspirations of the Children Act, 
1989, which represents the primary legal statement about the relationship 
between state and family. There is a danger of narrow concerns about child 
protection crowding out broader legal and ethical questions about child and family 
rights.    
Learning for Research    
 Despite low numbers, this evaluation shows that it is possible to mount a 
randomised control trial of children coming into state care. Highly disadvantaged 
children deserve high quality evidence about the impact of interventions supported 
by the state.    
 There is a continued need for innovation in data collection, in the context of high 
family stress. The apps developed for this evaluation were largely unsuccessful 
but this should not deter future innovation.    
 There is a balance to be found between aspiring to the highest standards of 
scientific excellence and finding practical solutions to the complex processes of 
public systems.    
 While priority should be given to understanding the impact of alternatives to 
interventions like foster and residential care, there is much to learn about effective 
practice for families in need of what is called ‘early help’ or ‘family support’.    
Recommendations  
The initial scale up of Safe Families between January 2015 and March 2016 
demonstrates from the feedback from families, the potential to alter the way in which 
local authorities respond to children on the edge of care, forging a new relationship 
between public systems and civil society, and providing a model for other reforms. 
However, as with all start-ups, there remains much to learn, and challenges to be 
overcome before the potential of the innovation can be fully realised. Based on the 
evaluation results, DSRU recommends:  
 while Safe Families can play a useful role offering support for families whose 
children are not at risk of being accommodated in foster care, providing what local 
13 
 
authorities call ‘early help’, according to the feedback from the families involved, 
the primary benefit of Safe Families comes from its provision of an alternative for 
about 15% of children who each year come into foster or residential care. The 
promise lies in the potential benefits to children and families by exposing them to 
greater community support and less system involvement, and to the easing 
pressure on hard-pressed local authority budgets.  
 if the first recommendation is accepted, we estimate that each year there would be 
as many as 708 children on the edge of care in the 3 regions covered by Safe 
Families and within the 20 early adopter local authorities. Two-thirds of these 708 
children could be successfully diverted from foster or residential care. Extending 
Safe Families to 90% of local authorities in the existing 3 hub areas (meaning the 
innovation would serve 47 local authorities in total) could see it divert 1,533 
children from care annually. We therefore recommend that Safe Families favour 
consolidation in existing local authorities, and extending into new local authorities 
within existing regions, over the development of new regions. These 2 options 
need not be mutually exclusive, it is a matter of balance.  
 however, none of this potential can be realised unless Safe Families and user 
local authorities collaborate to ensure a good and timely match between the 
innovation and the families that can benefit from the innovation (those whose 
reaction to a crisis means that their younger children are at risk of a short period of 
accommodation in care). We recommend finding a lasting solution to this 
challenge.  
 the potential for local authorities to translate reductions in the flow of children into 
care into reduced numbers in care at any one time (or a reduction in overall bed 
nights) cannot be realised without them paying more attention to the management 
of system dynamics (engaging local people and experts to choose a number that 
is right for local conditions; managing stock and flow; analysing the consequences 
of decisions at one point in the system for another). Through the contact between 
the evaluation team and local authority project participants, DSRU staff have been 
struck by the loss of knowledge about system dynamics within local authorities. 
We recommend that local authorities using Safe Families are given more access 
to training and tools to manage foster and residential care numbers to a level that 
is comfortable for elected members, the executive and senior practitioners.  
 there are early suggestions that Safe Families does no harm for the children it 
supports, the primary threshold for any innovation. However, the numbers in the 
trial are too low to indicate this with any confidence, or the overall impact of Safe 
Families on the stress levels of the primary carers - the catalyst for seeking 
support from children’s services - or on the well-being of children. We therefore 
recommend that the evaluation continue in as many user local authorities as 
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possible. Mistakes were made by DSRU in the initial trial, and these need to be 
rectified in any future evaluation.  
 no innovation should stand still. Others, in time, will build on Safe Families 
success and create new models. We recommend Safe Families undertakes a 
series of small experiments, varying the core model: for example,  extending the 
programme to older adolescents, or trying to recruit volunteers from sources 
outside  the Christian church. If successful, such adaptations should be rolled out 
more widely.  
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Aims 
The evaluation sought to answer 3 primary and 2 secondary questions. The primary 
questions were of most interest to local authorities, and formed part of all the PSP 
agreements: 
1. Does Safe Families divert the flow of children into foster and residential care by 
10%? 
2. Is there any evidence of increased stress on carers whose children are supported 
by Safe Families? 
3. Is there any evidence of impairment to the well-being of children supported by 
Safe Families? 
The secondary research questions concerned the conditions to be satisfied if Safe 
Families was to achieve impact at scale: 
1. Does Safe Families reach needy families in a timely manner? 
2. Is the programme scaling in line with the Rogers’ strategy described above? 
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Background 
Safe Families for Children originated in Chicago, Illinois, the brainchild of David 
Anderson, the Chief Executive of Lydia Homes, a major provider of child welfare services 
in the city. A lot of claims have been made for Safe Families in the United States, 
primarily focusing on its ability to support at home children who otherwise would have 
gone into state care. These claims, which may or may not be true, are being rigorously 
evaluated in the U.S. as well as England.  
The idea is that Safe Families offers 3 types of volunteers. There are host families who 
will take the children into their homes to stay for short periods; family friends who offer 
support (they are friends not therapists), and resource friends, who will offer or find goods 
or support that disadvantaged families need, such as a stair-gate or help clearing the 
garden. Many programmes - Homestart for example - offer one of these inputs. Safe 
Families is unique in offering all 3. 
Lydia Homes is a Christian based Non-Governmental Organisation. Anderson finds 
volunteers from the Christian Church. As they like to say in Safe Families, ‘finding the 
volunteers is straightforward because we know where they are on a Sunday morning’. 
Established in 2003, Safe Families is now operating in over 40 sites across the United 
States. However, just as there have been few reliable studies of the efficacy of placement 
of children in foster or residential care, there is no well-founded research about the 
impact of Safe Families on child outcomes. The Juvenile Protection Association in 
Chicago, Illinois undertook a good descriptive study in 2009. They found that children 
stayed with host families for extensive periods (an average of 53 days). There was some 
indication that the rate of children removed into what is called ‘protective custody’ - state 
care in England - was lower than for families getting support from child protection 
services - what we would think of as early help in England (8% for Safe Families, 16% for 
child protection services). However, these differences, and potential implied cost benefits 
and savings to public systems, cannot be reliably attributed to the intervention. A low 
cost, randomised control trial, facing many of the same challenges encountered in the 
DSRU evaluation, is being undertaken by a team led by Mark Testa at the University of 
North Carolina: Chapel Hill. 
In 2013, the Vardy Foundation invested £2m to translate the programme for use in the 
England, focusing attention on local authorities in North-East England. In contrast to work 
in the U.S., the work focused more on children supported at home by children’s services 
under the banner of early help, although many still took advantage of the respite offered 
by host families.  
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Legal, Administrative and Fiscal Context 
Public perceptions of children in care have progressed since Dickensian times, when 
they were thought of as orphaned children rescued from the street. In fact there are 
hardly any orphans. In 1968 and again in 1986,  Jean Packman provided a helpful 
typology of children in care comprising victims - of neglect and abuse; volunteers - whose 
parents find they are temporarily unable to cope and have no back up; and villains - 
whose behaviour is beyond what parents, and sometimes schools, can deal with. 
Unfortunately, this has never been replicated. In this context, it is the children who are 
volunteered into care who are the one’s best suited to an innovation like Safe Families.  
The majority of children coming into care (or being looked after) are separated under a 
voluntary arrangement between the primary carer and the local authority. The children 
are not separated by compulsion: they are accommodated with foster parents or, in a 
minority of cases, in a residential home. The primary carer can ask for their children to 
come back to the family home at any time, and a social worker can only object by going 
to court and asking magistrate or judge to intervene with an order. 
These voluntary arrangements have long been a part of the English and Welsh system of 
supporting children away from home (they are less common abroad, and do not apply in 
the U.S. context). Arrangements were clarified in the ground-breaking framework 
legislation of the Children Act, 1989, which re-defined the relationship between the state 
and family. Section 20 of the 1989 Act covers these voluntary arrangements. Three-fifths 
of looked after children in England are under Section 20, and three-fifths of them are 10 
years of age or less. Most stay for short-periods of time, with most back at home within a 
matter of weeks2. 
Prior to legislation in 1963, it was not possible for local authorities to take actions 
designed to prevent children coming into foster or residential care. Gradually, this 
changed and the 1989 legislation enshrined much higher levels of family support for what 
were called ‘children in need’. Most of this provision was covered under Section 17 of the 
Act and, consistent with the rest of the legislation, this extended to all needs, including 
disability for example. At the beginning of this century, government began to take a 
census of the number of children who local authorities considered to be in need, a list 
that soon mushroomed to about a third of a million at any one time. In the last decade, 
this family support aimed at helping children to remain at home with their primary carers 
is often referred to as ‘early help’.  
                                            
 
2 Although three-fifths of children coming into care do so under Section 20 of the 1989 legislation, less than 
a third of children in care on any single day come under the same legal status, because stays of children 
entering under voluntary arrangements are short, so many children are in and out quickly, whereas the 
snapshot comprises more children who stay for long periods, the majority of whom are covered by care 
orders sanctioned by the courts. 
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The good intentions of the 1989 Act have, to some extent, been undermined by a failure 
to protect a small number of children from gross maltreatment, resulting in greater 
government scrutiny, a more stringent inspection and regulatory approach and much 
higher levels of bureaucracy, as picked up in the Munro Review of 2011. Many 
researchers (e.g. Brown, 2010 ) have noted the risk averse climate in which children’s 
services leaders and practitioners are working which might have been expected to lead 
to cautious responses to the innovation involved in this project. 
The idea, then, that an unpaid, untrained volunteer, albeit one who has been vetted using 
procedures modelled on those used by local authorities to assess foster parents, could 
support children who otherwise would come into care under Section 20 of the Children 
Act 1989 is unsurprisingly challenging for some. Indeed, officials in 4 local authorities 
raised questions about the legal status of children diverted from care. One local authority 
involved in the evaluation took the view that, although supported by Safe Families, the 
cases should still be captured under Section 20 and, as such, counted under local 
authority statistical returns, which stood against one of the primary aims of the 
innovation. 
The matter was considered by legal experts supporting DSRU, legal experts brought in 
by Safe Families for Children, and also by officials and lawyers at the Department for 
Education, which appointed 2 Directors of Children’s Services to look into the matter in 
more depth. 
It was concluded that, once hosting was agreed by the parent and Safe Families for 
Category 2: Edge of Care, support would be sanctioned under Section 17 of the Children 
Act, 1989, with the designation ‘children in need’. Where a parent seeks, of their own 
volition, to place their child in foster care under Section 20 of the legislation, they may be 
persuaded of the merits of Safe Families - including the host family option. In such an 
instance, the support is covered under Section 17 of the 1989 legislation. Most of the 20 
local authorities use this interpretation, but a handful take the view that, if a family meets 
the Section 20 threshold, then Safe Families cannot be considered as an option. Given 
the complexities and extensive scrutiny, Safe Families appointed national expert Wendy 
Rose to oversee a panel to continually improve already strong child protection 
procedures. DSRU’s view is summarised in Appendix 1. 
Safe Families finds itself at the fulcrum of competing forces in children’s services. On the 
one hand, government and the inspectorate, hold local authorities and individual 
practitioners to account for failures to protect children (Brown, 2010). On the other hand, 
the President of the Association of the Directors of Children’s Services and the President 
of the Family Division of the High Court are concerned by the high numbers of children in 
care. Or, to take another dimension, budgets for children’s services including schools 
continue to be severely cut, with the Director of one LA involved in the evaluation 
claiming there would be no resource for early help and family support by 2020. In this 
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context, the idea of testing the efficacy of the help available within civil society has 
become pressing. 
The Innovation Process 
In 2014, Sir Peter Vardy and Keith Danby, Chair and CEO of the Vardy Foundation, 
approached DSRU for help in evaluating the U.K. version of the programme. Our initial 
due diligence highlighted: 
 the potential of the programme to help public systems forge a better relationship 
with civil society 
 the possible benefits to child outcomes and local authority finances of using the 
programme to divert children away from foster care. 
DSRU scrutinised the religious component of the programme and found it to be restricted 
to volunteer and staff recruitment, and not in any way evangelical in the sense of 
proselytising Christianity to birth parents or children. We also found appropriate child 
protection processes in place. 
The due diligence also drew attention to: 
 the potential benefits of shifting the emphasis from early help to edge of care. It 
was clear that the U.S. version of Safe Families was aimed at families with greater 
levels of need, a higher proportion of whom were in danger of having their children 
placed in foster care. The child welfare systems in the U.S. and England are 
different, but there was clearly an opportunity for Safe Families to divert many 
more children away from the care system in England 
 the need to get help to families at the moment of crisis, not several weeks later. 
Our initial analysis showed that it could take local authorities between 3 and 6 
weeks to refer families to Safe Families, which in some cases could then take 
another 3 weeks to decide whether their intervention was appropriate. We knew 
from the earlier evidence that proximity of intervention to the moment of crisis 
would bear heavily on outcomes for parents and children 
 the value of a strategy to scale the innovation across the England. Sir Peter Vardy 
and Keith Danby both had huge expertise in scaling business propositions, but not 
in scaling interventions for children within public systems. They could see the 
opportunity to build an army of volunteers ready to help children across the 
England, but not the means to achieve the end 
 the need for rigorous evaluation to reliably estimate economic benefits and ensure 
that no children are disadvantaged. A strong evaluation had the potential to test 
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both the innovation and the orthodoxy, and to establish the basic ethic that public 
interventions first do no harm. 
In the summer of 2014, an opportunity to take the work of Safe Families forward was 
presented in the form of the Department for Education Innovation Fund. Safe Families 
and DSRU collaborated in producing a bid to the Fund to scale and evaluate the 
programme. DSRU methods were used to bring together stakeholders - Safe Families 
staff, potential public system commissioners, volunteers and users - to examine available 
data, understand barriers to impact at scale, and then devise innovations to get around 
those barriers. We were aided in the process by the support of the Spring Consortium, 
which had been appointed by the Department for Education to assist applicants, with 
help on business planning proving particularly useful. 
A revised model of Safe Families emerged, as it is set out in the application to the 
Department for Education in the autumn of 2014 (available on request). The Innovation 
Fund awarded Safe Families £2.4m, sufficient to implement the innovations, scale and 
evaluate the programme. A significant limitation of the funding was that money had to be 
spent in the 2015-16 financial year. 
Five Innovations 
The process of innovation just described meant that the Safe Families programme 
delivered after support from the Department for Education Innovation Fund award 
differed from that being operated in the North-East of England in 5 important respects. 
First, after modelling flows of children into local authority care across England, we 
estimated that around 15% of children being placed in foster care each year could safely 
be supported by Safe Families volunteers, and that two-thirds of those children would not 
subsequently require support from children’s services, with a net reduction of in-flow into 
foster care of 10% a year in each participating local authority at steady state. This was 
consistent with the Department for Education Innovation Fund’s goals to ease pressure 
on social workers and reduce the flow of children into care. 
It was therefore planned to encourage local authorities to use Safe Families for 2 types of 
case: Category 1: early help or family support cases (in other words continuing the model 
delivered in the North-East of England); and Category 2: Edge of Care’ cases. 
Category 2: Edge of Care cases were defined as children aged 10 years or under; whose 
primary carer was making a request for voluntary accommodation under Section 20 of 
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the Children Act, 1989; and where there were no serious child protection concerns or 
obvious threats to the host family or other volunteers3. 
At steady state, it was estimated that Safe Families would support 75 families (and 
approximately 160 children) in each local authority each year, covering both Category 1 
and Category 2. In order to ensure good implementation quality, it was agreed to support 
25 families in year 1, 40 families in year 2, arriving at steady state of 75 families in year 3. 
Second, analysis of Safe Families work in the North-East showed that getting the 
intervention to families as quickly as possible after the precipitating crisis would be a 
critical contributor to a successful outcome. This included being responsive to families 
who sought help from children’s services departments out of office hours. 
This innovation is referred to as ‘just in time’. It avoids the typical pattern whereby 
children’s services assess cases for several days before referring on to a voluntary 
organisation, who prolongs the assessment process further. An app was built to sit on 
social workers’ desktop computers, or on their phones or tablets,  which the social worker 
used  for 2 or 3 minutes per case. It ascertained whether there was a match between the 
referral and the threshold criteria (both Category 1 and Category 2) for Safe Families. If 
there was a match, and the mother or other primary carer agreed, the app sent an email 
directly to the Safe Families social worker who visited within 2 working days. 
Third, to have significant impact on the lives of children in the England, Safe Families 
required a scale strategy. The approach taken was based on Rogers’ (1962) diffusion 
theory . If Safe Families could successfully implement its programme in 16% (N=24) of 
the 150 English local authorities, a natural pull would be generated among successive 
groupings for the 84% of later adopters. 
Because volunteer recruitment crossed local authority boundaries, it was decided to 
operate in hubs comprising 4 to 10 local authorities. In addition to the North-East 
(potentially 12 local authorities), it was proposed to establish Safe Families hubs in 
Merseyside (potentially 7 local authorities); Greater Manchester (10); East Midlands (9); 
and West Midlands (14). 
Fourth, because the evidence for the effectiveness of Safe Families had fallen short of 
the standard used by DSRU’s Investing in Children what works repository, widely used 
by English and Scottish local authorities, it was necessary to find a way of getting local 
authorities to test the programme before making a longer term commitment. 
                                            
 
3 The wording on the app - described in the following page - encourages local authority social workers to 
refer cases ‘on the trajectory towards accommodation’. There may be a gap between this wording and the 
Category 2 definition, and this may have contributed to the referral of cases below the intended threshold.  
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The solution adopted was a Public Social Partnership between Safe Families, each 
participating local authority, an independent investor and DSRU, operating as the 
independent arbiter. Sometimes known as ‘try before you buy’, the PSP allowed local 
authorities to try Safe Families for a period of up to 12 months without payment. Costs 
were covered by an independent investor. During the trial period, a rigorous evaluation 
established whether the programme achieved what each of the parties to the PSP 
wanted it to achieve. If the results were positive, the local authority bought the 
programme for a subsequent 2-year period.  
The regular commissioning rules are suspended during the period of the PSP to allow for 
the innovation to be tested, but resume at the end of the PSP contract. 
Fifth, while it was anticipated that Safe Families had the potential to reduce the flow of 
children into care by 10%, it was known that the resultant empty foster beds would only 
be filled by other needy children. In other DSRU studies (forthcoming), we estimate that 
for every child in care, there are another 6 with exactly the same profile not in care. Much 
of the variance in the numbers of children in care from one local authority to another is 
not explained by need. Most of the differences are explained by system factors; some by 
the explicit decisions of system leaders and practitioners; some by the dynamics that 
occur as a result of complex processes, like connecting needy children with a range of 
high-end supports. 
DSRU has long experience of helping local authorities to manage system dynamics, 
usually with the objective of reducing numbers: the same process can be used to 
increase numbers. 
It was decided to offer each participating local authority a seminar on how to manage 
system dynamics supported by local data. The idea was that, with the right advice, local 
authorities would take the necessary steps to translate gains made thanks to Safe 
Families into actual reductions in the number of children in care. 
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Methodology 
A mixed method approach was used. This included scrutiny of administrative records on 
569 children in need or on the edge of care held by 20 local authorities and Safe 
Families, and regular checking in with the Safe Families project management system 
covering volunteer and family recruitment, matching of families and volunteers. We also 
undertook qualitative interviews with 15 birth parents and volunteers and 10 local 
authority staff, in order to understand their satisfaction with the programme, and also to 
get suggestions for improvement. We held 5 seminars of Safe Families staff and 
interviewed local authority staff to get feedback on DSRU-led innovations such as the 
PSP. Some additional bespoke data was assembled on behalf of some of the 
participating local authorities. Ethical approval for the study was given by the DSRU 
Ethics Committee run by Centre for Social Policy fellows4, and additional scrutiny was 
given by a handful of the participating local authorities. 
At the core of the evaluation was a randomised control trial of 26 Category 2 cases. 
Families referred to the programme by local authority teams were screened using the 
app described above, or by a paper-based approach applying the same criteria. This 
identified whether the family matched the criteria for Category 2: Edge of Care provision; 
asked the main carer for permission for a Safe Families caseworker to visit the family 
home,  and sent an email to the local Safe Families office to begin the referral process. 
Safe Families committed to conducting a home visit to all families entered by the app 
within 2 working days of receiving the email. A separate procedure was operated for 
emergency cases allowing for eligibility to be assessed outside of the home.  
On visiting the family, in addition to undertaking their own assessment, it was planned for 
the Safe Families caseworker to hand parents a tablet that contained a second app. This 
comprised a procedure for giving consent to participation,  and a series of questions 
relating to 3 scales: the Strengths and Difficulties Questionnaire (SDQ),5 focused on 
children’s well-being, including mental health; the Hospital Anxiety and Depression Scale 
(HADS), focused on parents’ stress and depression; and the Interpersonal Support 
Evaluation List (ISEL), focused on the amount of support available to carers. 
If the case was considered a match by the Safe Families caseworker, the app sent a 
message to the DSRU team that conducted a statistical procedure which randomly 
assigned each case to either an intervention group,  to receive Safe Families support; or 
a control group to receive services as usual from the local authority.  
                                            
 
4 http://centreforsocialpolicy.org 
5 We are grateful to Robert Goodman, the primary author of SDQ, for giving DSRU permission to use the 
measure as part of an app. As part of the arrangement, DSRU will report on the strengths and weaknesses 
of using the measure as part of app technology. 
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The statistical procedure involved a computer-generated randomisation sequence 
designed to provide user local authorities with a balance of cases in intervention and 
control groups over a 12 month period. Figure 1 summarises the randomisation 
arrangements. 
Figure 1: Randomisation Arrangements 
 
Enrolment Referred  
Assessed for 
eligibility  
Home Visit 
Excluded 
Baseline (T1) 
assessment  
SDQ; HADS; ISEL 
Randomised   
One-to-one allocation; separate 
randomisation list for each regional hub 
(Mersey, East Midlands, West Midlands) 
Allocated to intervention 
group  
Allocation Allocated to control group  
Follow-up assessment  
(8 weeks) (T2)  
SDQ; HADS; ISEL 
Follow-up 
Follow-up assessment  
(8 weeks) (T2)  
SDQ; HADS; ISEL 
Follow-up admin data  
(6 months) (T3)  
Follow-up admin data  
(6 months) (T3)  
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In addition, data were collected from administrative records at referral 6 months later, and 
directly from primary care givers, using the same app used by Safe Families caseworkers 
on a phone or tablet (these data were collected at referral and 8 weeks later). 
The randomised control trial addressed the 3 primary research questions. We 
hypothesised a successful outcome, and a reason for local authorities to continue 
commissioning Safe Families, against the 3 questions: 
1. Does Safe Families divert the flow of children into foster and residential care by 
10%? Success would mean: (i) Safe Families supported sufficient children from 
Category 2 in each user local authority; (ii) the majority of children in the control 
group went into care under Section 20, indicating that Safe Families was targeting 
and reaching the right children; (iii) less than a third of the children supported by 
Safe Families under Category 2 later came into foster or residential care. 
2. Is there any evidence of increased stress on carers whose children are supported 
by Safe Families? Success would mean the stress levels of mothers receiving 
Safe Families not deteriorating (that is, no harm) and, ideally, improving compared 
to the control group. We selected parental stress as an indicator because 
continued high levels of anxiety would likely lead to repeated calls on children’s 
services for support. 
3. Is there any evidence of impairment to the well-being of children supported by 
Safe Families? Success would mean no deterioration (that is, no harm) to children 
from families receiving the intervention, and ideally an improvement in well-being 
and mental health. 
Based on Safe Families capacity post-award of the Department for Education Innovation 
Fund grant, it was estimated that up to 360 families could be served in a 12-month 
evaluation period (April 2015-April 2016). It was calculated that such a sample would 
provide sufficient power to detect a between-group effect size of d=0.35: in plain terms, a 
strong indication of the success or failure of the programme. It was also planned to 
extend the trial to new areas, thus boosting the power of the evaluation over time.  
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Findings 
The results are reported in 3 sections. The first deals with a description of the take-up of 
Safe Families across 20 local authorities during the 15 month evaluation period. We 
move on to consider the effectiveness of the 5 innovations, and the secondary research 
questions. This is followed with a summary of results from the randomised controlled trial 
covering the primary research questions. 
Local Authority Take Up of Safe Families 
As might be expected, while the take up of Safe Families provision has been extensive it 
was still slower than anticipated at the planning stage, particularly with respect to families 
with children on the edge of care. Just over 15% of referrals of families (83) came under 
Category 2: Edge of Care in the financial year 2015/16, whilst for Category 1 (support for 
familes with children in need) there were 445 families referred. The conversion rate of 
referrals to support ran at 44% for Category 1 (192 families comprising 480 children), and 
48% for Category 2. As Table 1 illustrates, 40 of the 83 families seeking Category 2 help 
were supported by Safe Families, comprising 91 children6. Once again, East Midlands 
and Merseyside hubs were responsible for the majority (70%) of families supported under 
Category 2. 
Table 1: Referrals, Families Supported and Children Supported in the 2015/16 Financial Year 
 Families referred Families 
Supported* 
Children Supported 
Region Cat 1 Cat 2 Total Cat 1 Cat 2 Total Cat 1 Cat 2 Total 
G. Manchester 33 1 34 12 1 13 38 2 40 
Merseyside 67 27 94 29 10 39 82 24 104** 
East Midlands 88 33 121 44 18 62 114 41 155 
West Midlands 16 15 31 4 7 11 16 15 31 
North East 241 7 248 103 4 107 230 9 239 
Total 445 83 528 192 40 232 480 91 569 
 
*Families referred and supported in 2015/16 financial year. The table does not count those referred in 
                                            
 
6 In modelling Safe Families’ potential impact on rates of entry to foster care, we assumed 2.1 children per 
family; the actual rate in the 2015/16 financial year was 2.28 per family. 
27 
 
2015/16 financial year and supported in the 2016/17 financial year. 
**2 children were re-referred under a different category within the same year. 
 
Table 2 reveals 2 important findings from the Safe Families offer. First, unique among 
providers of early help and family support services, Safe Families is providing 218 nights 
of respite away from the family home for the 480 children supported under Category 1. 
Second, stays for those children placed with host families under Category 2 are relatively 
short, about 1.9 bed nights on average. 
Table 2: The Number of Bed Nights Provided to Children by Safe Families 
 Children Supported Bed Nights 
 Cat 1 Cat 2 Cat 1 Cat 2 
Greater Manchester 38 2 2 4 
Merseyside 82 24 10 35 
East Midlands 114 41 24 71 
West Midlands 16 15 3 25 
North East 230 9 179 39 
Total 480 91 218 174 
Average Bed Nights   0.45 1.91 
 
Length of stay provides an important indicator of the extent to which Safe Families is 
reaching families whose children really are at risk of coming into foster care under 
Section 20 of the Children Act, 1989. We estimate that children placed under voluntary 
arrangements are typically separated for between 4 and 12 days (see Appendix 2). As 
can be seen above, the average length of time of separation with a Safe Families host for 
Category 2 cases is 1.91 nights. For the sub-group of 13 families in the trial, the average 
number of nights separated was 2.75 with a range between one and 8 nights. On either 
count, the length of separation for Safe Families cases is considerably less, suggesting 
either the efficiency on the part of Safe Families staff and volunteers in getting children 
back to their birth families, or that they are receiving referrals that are challenging but fall 
below the Section 20 threshold, or both. 
28 
 
The Five Innovations 
Scale 
Arguably the greatest success of the Safe Families programme post award of the 
Department for Education Innovation Fund grant was to scale the programme to 20 local 
authorities: just short of the goal to be active in 16% (n=24) of the 150 English local 
authorities. In addition to the existing North-East hub, a further 4 hubs were established 
in Merseyside, Greater Manchester, East Midlands and West Midlands. 
As mentioned above, the primary failing of volunteer-based innovations is the difficulty in 
recruiting volunteers. Safe Families has clearly overcome this challenge. Table 3 counts 
new volunteers recruited in the 4 new hubs up to the end of March 2016. As can be seen, 
640 new volunteers were recruited, of whom over two-fifths (46%) had capability to offer 
respite for children from referred families in their own home. 
Table 3: New Volunteers Recruited by Safe Families in 4 New Hubs in the 2015/16 Financial Year 
 All Volunteers Host Families* 
 Approved In Process Approved In Process 
Greater Manchester 123 146 37 9 
Merseyside 208 163 81 30 
East Midlands 217 91 89 7 
West Midlands 92 95 24 16 
Total 640 495 231 62 
 
*Includes family friends also acting as hosts 
 
As of October 1st 2016, Safe Families had 1,969 volunteers approved, of which 634 had 
the capability to serve as a host family7. Consistent with other results, the spread of 
volunteers was not even, clustering in the East Midlands, Merseyside and the North-East, 
and within hubs, clustering in Wirral, Liverpool and Nottingham. It is unsurprising, 
therefore, that Safe Families consolidated its operations at the end of the first year into 3 
hubs, serving the North-East, North-West and Midlands.  
                                            
 
7 Safe Families management data 
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Consistent with the Rogers’ (1962) hypothesis, there was now a strong interest from 
other local authorities across England in buying Safe Families provision. However, 
therein lies a dilemma for the organisation. Table 4 goes back to the 5 original hubs. It 
shows that, in total, they had the potential to reach 52 local authorities (a third of those in 
England). At the end of the first 12 months, 20 of the 52 had signed PSPs and 
subsequently made commitments to fund Safe Families into a second year. If the 
programme reached its potential to support 15% of children coming into care under 
Section 20 of the Children Act, 1989, over 1,500 would be supported, and over 1,000 
would be diverted from the care system. As the final column of Table 4 indicates, the 
restricted reach within existing regions to 20 of the 52 possible local authorities means 
that between a third and half of children, and 91% in the West Midlands, would miss out. 
Table 4: Reach and potential market penetration in the 5 hub 
 Possible in 5 Hubs Potential in 20 LAs 
Served 
 
 Number 
of LAs 
15% of 
Entrants 
LAs 
Served 
15% of 
Entrants 
Potential 
Market 
Penetration 
Greater 
Manchester 
10 286 4 143 50% 
Merseyside 7 206 3 114 55% 
East Midlands 9 366 5 236 64% 
West Midlands 14 561 2 50 9% 
North East 12 284 6 165 58% 
Total 52 1703 20 708 42% 
 
The challenge for Safe Families is to know whether expanding into new regions will bring 
greater gains than consolidating and growing within existing geography. 
Just in Time 
There was a considerable reduction in the time taken for Safe Families and local 
authority social workers to respond to family crises, compared to the situation in the 
North-East pilot in the 18 months prior to the evaluation. However, in too many cases, the 
delays remain too long to act as a timely repost to a primary carers calls for help. The 
average time between referral and Safe Families visiting the family was 10 days, with a 
range of zero (i.e. on the day of crisis) to 43 days. The time between first visit and 
support being offered was 6 days, with a range of zero to 31 days. 
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Reaching Category 2 Cases 
As described above and in Appendix 2, local authorities’ enthusiasm to embrace Safe 
Families as an alternative to voluntary accommodation of children in care varied, but over 
the 15 months of evaluation referrals of edge of care cases grew and, as shown later, 
has continued to grow after the evaluation was closed. Overall, during the evaluation 
period, just over 15% of referrals came under Category 2: Edge of Care in the financial 
year 2015/16. As can be seen in Table 5, over two-thirds (72%) of the Category 2 
referrals came from the East Midlands and Merseyside, and 2 local authorities - 
Nottingham and Liverpool - were responsible for the majority of the referrals in these 2 
hubs. 
Table 5: Referrals to Safe Families in the 2015/16 Financial Year 
Region Cat 1 Cat 2 Total 
Greater Manchester 33 1 34 
Merseyside 67 27 94 
East Midlands 88 33 121 
West Midlands 16 15 31 
North East 241 7 248 
Total 445 83 528 
 
The conversion rate of referrals to support at 48% for Category 2 was described earlier. If 
we take this analysis further, and relate the level of Category 2 cases with the pool of 
possible cases, as summarised in Table 6, it can be seen that, within existing local 
authorities served, Safe Families only reached 13% of its potential targets during the 
evaluation period. 
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Table 6: Reach and potential market penetration in the 5 hubs 
 LAs 
Served 
15% of 
Entrants 
Category 2 
Children 
Served 
Potential 
Market 
Penetration 
Greater Manchester 4 143 2 1% 
Merseyside 3 114 24 21% 
East Midlands 5 236 41 17% 
West Midlands 2 50 15 30% 
North East 6 165 9 5% 
Total 20 708 91 13% 
 
Unfortunately, the low level of connection between need and service meant that there 
were fewer than anticipated cases for the randomised control trial. As Table 7 shows, 
only 13 of the 40 families supported by Safe Families under Category 2: Edge of Care 
were also included in the evaluation trial, and all but one of these cases came from either 
the East Midlands or Merseyside hubs. These 13 cases are matched with another 13 
drawn from the 43 families not supported by Safe Families. 
 
Table 7: The Number of Category 2 Cases Included in the RCT 
 Category 2 Cases Category 2 Trial 
 Referred Supported Control Intervention 
Greater Manchester 1 1 0 0 
Merseyside 27 10 7 6 
East Midlands 33 18 6 6 
West Midlands 15 7 0 1 
North East 7 4 0 0 
Total 83 40 13 13 
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By any standard, 26 families is too low a number from which to draw reliable findings and 
falls far short of the 360 anticipated. 
Public Social Partnership (PSP) 
A review of the PSP was undertaken by DSRU one year after the beginning of the 
evaluation. It shows mixed results. The PSP had clear attractions for the senior 
leadership of local authorities, in that it allowed them to try Safe Families to see whether 
it worked, without having to pay until the innovation was shown to work. If it did work, it 
would clearly be cost-beneficial to the local authority. The level below senior leadership 
were less enthusiastic, and many commissioning staff responsible for agreeing the 
individual PSP contracts viewed it with suspicion, particularly since it bypassed many of 
the ordinary checks and balances that makes a public system work efficiently and fairly. 
This meant that senior staff in Safe Families had to do much more work than they had 
anticipated, trying to convince commissioners to adopt the PSP model, some of whom 
only signed up several months into the free period. We cannot tell whether the use of 
conventional contractual arrangements would have been easier or quicker. 
The basic idea of a PSP is to try before buying, with the decision to buy being guided by 
the results of evaluation. As it turned out, 20 local authorities decided to buy without 
having seen the evaluation results and, as far as we know, no local authority declined to 
buy Safe Families because of the evaluation. In this sense, we failed to implement the 
basic PSP idea. 
DSRU has used the results from Safe Families to develop the PSP concept as part of a 
broader investment portfolio for innovation in children’s services, but we accept that its 
utility on a deal by deal basis such as Safe Families is as yet unproven. 
The System Dynamics Seminars 
Only half of the local authorities took up the offer of a seminar on management of system 
dynamics, and we could not see any evidence of any actions resulting from the seminars 
except in 2 local authorities that have engaged with DSRU to take a more robust and 
rigorous approach to the challenge. 
The Trial 
In this section we report the findings, however as has been indicated, the number of 
children recruited into the randomised control trial is too low from which to draw reliable 
results. 
As Figure 2 shows, although 59 cases were referred into the trial, only 26 were 
eventually included. With the benefit of hindsight, the strict randomisation procedure 
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selected by DSRU was counter-productive. While it was sufficient to satisfy the most 
sceptical scientist, it also meant that one local authority experienced 4 consecutive 
referrals being randomised to control in a short period. This naturally upset both hard 
pressed social workers and Safe Families caseworkers, and undermined the confidence  
of local authority leadership in the programme. Using the best evaluation method 
probably contributed to lower numbers.  
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Figure 2: Consolidated Standards of Reporting Trials (CONSORT) Flow Diagram 
 
 
It took much longer than anticipated for Safe Families to get started in the 20 local 
authorities, meaning that recruitment of cases into trial was also delayed. Several came 
near to the end of the trial period for each PSP, the 31st of March 2016. Since we sought 
to follow up all cases for 6 months, this meant the preparation of this report was also 
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delayed. Figure 3 illustrates the pattern of recruitment of cases across the 3 consolidated 
regions. 
Figure 3: Randomisation dates by regional hub (single case in June 2016 excluded from figure) 
 
 
Bearing in mind all of the caveats about the data, we explore, below, what they say about 
the primary research questions. 
Does Safe Families divert the flow of children into foster and 
residential care by 10%? 
Success would mean: (i) Safe Families supported sufficient children from Category 2 in 
each user local authority; (ii) the majority of children in the control group went into care 
under Section 20, indicating that Safe Families was targeting and reaching the right 
children; (iii) less than a third of the children supported by Safe Families under Category 
2 later came into foster or residential care. 
Safe Families did not support sufficient children from Category 2 in most of the local 
authorities to meet the first criterion for success. As has been seen, the flow of Category 
2 cases was uneven, and only got near to target in 2 local authorities: Nottingham and 
Liverpool. Moreover, analysis of children allocated to the control group, summarised in 
Table 8, indicates that few of the children in the trial met the criteria for Section 20 of the 
Children Act 1989. Once the Safe Families option was stopped, as a result of allocation 
of the case to the control group, 6 of the 13 families received no further support from 
children’s services, and only 3 got more early help support. In 2 cases the threshold was 
met, and in one case the situation bordered on being beyond what Safe Families could 
responsibly manage. In addition to the trial cases, Safe Families also supported 78 
families under Category 2 outside of the evaluation, several of which were counted as an 
emergency. These cases were much more likely to meet the Section 20 threshold. 
On the third criterion for success, no children in the intervention group entered care in the 
6 month follow up period, (2 from the control group entered care and one was placed 
36 
 
under a Special Guardianship Order) suggesting that Safe Families was diverting cases 
away from the social care system, and, in some cases, from foster and residential care. 
Table 8: The situation and outputs for the 13 families in the control group 
Case 
Number 
Number of 
Children 
Circumstances pre-referrals Circumstances post referral 
1 2 Early help Case closed but re-opened as 
early help in follow-up period 
2 3 Early help Case closed but re-opened as 
early help in follow-up period 
3 2 New case No further social care 
involvement 
4 4 Two children with special needs, 2 
with no direct social care 
involvement 
One placed under special 
guardianship arrangements, one 
placed in special school, 2 with 
no further social care 
involvement 
5 4 New case Supported as early help case 
6 1 Child in care. Plan to step down 
from care using Safe Families 
Due to mother’s health, child 
returned to, and remained with, 
foster family  
7 1 Mother asking for local authority to 
accommodate child 
Child eventually taken into care 
via a care order and now 
awaiting adoption 
8 2 Mother asking for local authority to 
accommodate child 
Child accommodated under 
Section 20 for 2 nights 
9 5 New case No further social care 
involvement 
10 7 New case No further social care 
involvement 
11 2 New case No further social care 
involvement 
12 2 New case No further social care 
involvement 
13 3 New case No further social care 
involvement 
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Is there any evidence of increased stress on carers whose children are 
supported by Safe Families?  
Success would mean the stress levels of mother’s receiving Safe Families did not 
deteriorate (that is, no harm was done) and improved compared to the control group. We 
selected parental stress as an indicator because continued high levels of anxiety would 
likely lead to repeated calls on children’s services for support. 
As Table 9 shows, parental anxiety reduced over time for the primary carer in both 
intervention and control group, with slightly greater gains for those in the control group. 
Similarly, depression decreased for the primary carer in both groups, this time with more 
gains for the Safe Families participants.  
Table 9: Primary Carer Anxiety and Depression 
 Pre-test Mean (SD) Post-test Mean (SD) 
Subscale Control 
(n=12) 
Intervention 
(n=13) 
Difference Control 
(n=5) 
Intervention 
(n=9) 
Difference 
Anxiety 13.08 
(4.03) 
14.54 (3.18) 1.46 9.00 
(2.74) 
12.56 (5.36) 3.56 
Depression 11.08 
(4.89) 
12.47 (4.02) 1.39 8.57 
(2.45) 
8.96 (5.88) 0.39 
 
(Note: a mean change score of below zero indicates average reductions in scores, with positive figures 
indicating increases in scores) 
 
We also assessed the perceived availability of 4 separate forms of social support in the 
control and intervention group using a measure called the ISEL: "tangible" support 
measures the perceived availability of material aid; the "appraisal" subscale captures the 
perceived availability of someone to talk to about one's problems; the "self-esteem" 
subscale, the perceived availability of a positive comparison when comparing one's self 
to others; and the "belonging" subscale, the perceived availability of people with whom to 
share life’s pleasures. Table 10 summarises the results, with lower scores indicating 
lower levels of perceived support.  
Despite the control group having higher levels of perceived support at pre-test (on all 
scales), by post-test, those families receiving Safe Families reported much higher levels 
of perceived support, more than they had reported at pre-test and more compared to the 
control group at pre and post-test. This may reflect the availability of a range of 
volunteers providing resources, friendship and respite for the children over an extended 
period of time, a mean of 6 months for those in the trial, with 3 of the 13 cases still open 
when the evaluation was closed in September 2016. 
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In summary, there is no evidence of the Safe Families intervention harming the carers of 
children in supported families, and there is some indication that there could be benefits, 
particularly with respect to reduced stress and depression, and increased perceived 
social support. However, further evidence is needed to support this finding.. 
As Table 11 illustrates, levels of satisfaction with Safe Families among primary carers, 
usually the mothers of children supported, is extremely high, whereas levels of 
satisfaction decreased among control parents, though the small sample size should be 
acknowledged. Carers were asked to rate each of the components of the Safe Families 
service, not just the 3 core elements of host family, family friend, and resource friend. 
Again, the number of cases in the sample is small, and variation in results is low, but 
nonetheless, satisfaction levels are about as high as could be achieved for this kind of 
innovation operating in the context of high levels of family stress. 
Table 10: Levels of Social Support for Primary Carer 
 Pre-test Mean (SD) Post-test Mean (SD) 
Subscale Control 
(n=10) 
Intervention 
(n=11) 
Difference Control 
(n=5) 
Intervention 
(n=10) 
Difference 
Overall 
score 
52.94 
(28.06)  
33.69 
(12.44)  
19.25 47.93 
(19.33) 
59.70 
(27.02) 
11.77 
Tangible 
support 
10.83 (8.83) 5.33 (5.26) 5.50 7.24 
(5.50) 
12.80 
(7.07) 
5.56 
Belonging 
support 
11.91 (8.34) 6.27 (4.58) 5.64 11.93 
(5.89) 
13.78 
(8.63) 
1.85 
Self-
esteem 
support 
15.40 (4.84) 10.86 (4.66) 4.54 16.75 
(2.22) 
15.81 
(6.49) 
0.94 
Appraisal 
support 
14.80 (8.29) 11.07 (6.45) 3.73 12.00 
(7.97) 
17.31 
(7.56) 
5.31 
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Table 11: Carer Satisfaction with Different Aspects of Safe Families Provision 
 Average 
Rating (0=Low, 
10=High) 
N 
Host Family 9.50 10 
Family Friend 9.20 5 
Resource Friends 9.33 3 
Family Support Manager 9.27 11 
Family Coach 9.56 9 
Overall 9.82 11 
Recommend to a friend 9.73 11 
 
Is there any evidence of impairment to the well-being of children 
supported by Safe Families?  
Success would mean no deterioration (that is, no harm) to children from families 
receiving the intervention, and ideally an improvement in well-being and mental health. 
We measured child well-being using a widely applied measure known as the Strengths 
and Difficulties Questionnaire that captures 4 domains of mental health - emotional 
difficulties, conduct problems, hyperactivity and peer relationships - as well as children’s 
capacity to act in pro-social ways; for example, helping others. The results are 
summarised in Table 12.  
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Table 12: Children’s Mental Health and Pro-social Behaviour 
 Pre-test Mean (SD) Post-test Mean (SD) 
Subscale Control 
(n=27) 
Intervention 
(n=22) 
Differ Control 
(n=12) 
Intervention 
(n=18) 
Differ 
Total Difficulties 15.70 
(6.09) 
20.82 (6.33) 5.12 17.25 
(4.33) 
17.50 
(7.97) 
0.25 
Emotional 
symptoms 
3.63 (2.53) 5.00 (2.71) 1.37 4.17 
(2.86) 
3.89 (2.85) 0.28 
Conduct 
problems 
4.30 (2.18) 5.18 (2.17) 0.88 5.00 
(1.48) 
4.61 (2.43) 0.39 
Hyperactivity/att
ention 
4.33 (3.10) 6.41 (3.03) 2.08 4.75 
(2.26) 
4.83 (3.09) 0.08 
Peer 
relationships 
problems 
3.44 (1.40) 4.23 (1.82) 0.79 3.33 
(1.61) 
4.17 (2.12) 0.84 
Pro-social 
behaviour 
8.22 (1.78) 7.09 (2.67) 1.13 7.50 
(1.73) 
7.83 (1.76) 0.33 
 
(Notes: higher scores indicate poor outcomes on all scales apart from pro-social scale, and a mean change 
score of below zero indicates average reductions in scores, with positive figures indicating increases in 
scores.) 
 
As can be seen, prior to the intervention beginning, the Safe Families group had poorer 
scores than the control group on all the domains, but had improved to the level of the 
control group by the time of follow-up. The deteriorating situation of the children in the 
control group - that is, not receiving Safe Families’ support - would signal concern were it 
evident in many more cases. 
In summary, there is no evidence of Safe Families intervention harming the children it 
supports under its Category 2 provision, and there is some indication that there could be 
benefits. Again, more evidence is needed to be sure about this trend. 
 
  
41 
 
Conclusions and Recommendations 
The previous pages have mostly reported what Safe Families does, how the programme 
developed and what the evaluation discovered. In this section, we set out our reflections 
on those findings, offering opinions on how the innovation is performing and how it could 
do better. 
For the most part, Safe Families should be regarded as a successful innovation, one that 
has the potential to transform children’s services in England and pave the way for others 
to follow and build upon. It offers pointers to how to respond differently to children, who 
have consistently been shown, in research studies over the last 3 decades, to benefit 
little from - and occasionally be harmed by - traditional admission to care practice. Future 
evaluations should explore the impact on groups such as older adolescents, for whom 
innovation has been scant and untested. 
Among the indicators of success,  we point to going from a start up charity to delivering 
services supporting several hundred children in 20 local authorities within a 2 year 
period.  
We can only speculate on why it has scaled, but our experience leads us to stress the 
following:  
 there was a good scale strategy rooted in evidence relevant to public systems 
 the innovation is simple and well explained 
 it is right for the political and social context, effectively linking public systems with 
civil society 
 there is a clear pull from the primary purchaser, local authority children’s services 
 Safe Families’ leadership invested a lot of what we came to call ‘sweat equity’, 
spending much more time than anticipated with local authority managers on 
working through routine problems - as did Safe Families staff - learning to respond 
to local demand such as the Friday afternoon crisis that causes major headaches 
for local authority social workers. 
Safe Families clearly addresses a fundamental challenge for local authorities in the post-
economic crash era, namely forging a new relationship between public systems and civil 
society. There are huge tapped, but unrecorded, and untapped resources in civil society. 
Safe Families is drawing on untapped resource, recruiting thousands of volunteers willing 
to take on roles previously reserved for foster parents. Local authorities find it extremely 
difficult to find volunteers, and most programmes that rely on them operate at limited 
scale, due to limited supply. Safe Families appears to have sensible, well thought out, 
solutions to these challenges. 
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Safe Families identified people in society who want to help families, and it matched 
volunteers’ capability and capacity to the different roles of supporting needy families. 
Safe Families is drawing out those who want to befriend, provide resources or take in 
other people’s children for short periods. These people appear to be in plentiful supply: 
they do not seek financial remuneration and are not over burdened by unreasonable 
requests - for example, to take in children for longer periods than they can comfortably 
manage. 
This finding-and-matching process has resulted in high levels of consumer satisfaction 
among volunteers and families in need. Foster carers are known for their ability to forge 
close bonds with their foster children, but perhaps they are less known for their work with 
the birth parents. Safe Families’ volunteers appear to be doing both, and it is noteworthy 
that, in some cases, the bond results in a relationship that outlasts the involvement of 
both local authority and Safe Families. As one social worker commented to us about one 
of his cases: 
“Safe Families was a really positive experience for this family, and their support 
through hosting prevented the family from being in crisis, and potentially could 
have led to the children having to be placed outside of the immediate family 
without this support. The family have continued the hosting arrangement despite 
Safe Families officially withdrawing due to the friendship between children in both 
families.” 
Public system satisfaction with Safe Families is also high, as evidenced by the 20 local 
authorities that were prepared to buy the intervention at the end of the one year trial 
period, despite the evaluation data not being available. This attraction, essential to the 
effective scaling of interventions, has extended beyond the 20 early adopter local 
authorities to another 10 potential users in different parts of the country. Such buy-in is 
remarkable, given the restrictions on local authority finances. 
Safe Families should also be commended for undertaking evaluation that gives tentative 
evidence for the principle of ‘first do no harm’. It is worth reflecting that if Safe Families is 
at least as good as foster and residential care in terms of birth parent and child 
outcomes, it represents a better proposition to local authorities because it keeps children 
in their home environment, supports the family for longer periods of time and engages 
civil society. 
Lessons Learned 
The innovation, and DSRU’s support, has not been problem free. The PSP financing 
mechanism enjoyed a mixed response from local authorities and Safe Families. In 
mitigation, we observe that the requirement to disburse the Department for Education 
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funding within the 2015/16 financial year greatly reduced leverage on local authority 
funds and resulted in many getting a much foreshortened free period. In addition, without 
the PSP, Safe Families would have taken their chances with orthodox commissioning 
arrangements, and it is doubtful they would have scaled to 20 local authorities under 
those conditions. Nonetheless, there are important lessons to be drawn from the trial. 
In DSRU, the apps we produced to help local authorities match eligible cases to Safe 
Families provision in a timely way, and to collect well-being data from family members in 
a non-intrusive manner, were largely unsuccessful. Many local authorities could not make 
the referral app work on the desktop technology available, and social workers were 
restricted in how they can use personal phones and tablets. Much of the outcome data 
was collected using old fashioned paper and pencil techniques. DSRU innovations were 
conceptually sophisticated but the technological follow-through was lacking. These 
failures may have fed into the less-than-hoped-for progress in reducing the amount of 
time between family crises and Safe Families response, where more needs to be done to 
make the average experience more like the best. 
The randomised control trial, while important, is limited by lack of numbers. To some 
extent, the low numbers reflect the low number of children on the edge of care referred 
by local authorities and signed up by Safe Families. In addition, DSRU’s over zealous 
methodological approach caused discomfort for local authorities, and, in one case, 
severe irritation. There will need to be rigorous evaluation of the Safe Families 
intervention in the future, not only for what it can tell us about the intervention, but also 
for what it will reveal about the experience of children coming into orthodox foster care. 
We have learned of the need for a practical balance between scientific rigour on the one 
hand, and the practicalities of supporting vulnerable children on the other. We did not 
achieve the right balance in this evaluation. 
As has been noted, the impact of the system dynamic seminars was limited. The seminar 
leader drew on ideas based on research from the 1980s and 1990s, dealing with 
knowledge that, 3 decades ago would have been well understood by leaders and middle 
managers in local authorities. The seminar leader observed that much of this wisdom - 
for example about the difference between the numbers of children in care and the flow of 
children into and out of care – appears to have diminished. Nonetheless, we were left 
with the impression that, in the majority of the 20 LAs studied, system dynamics were 
influencing the decisions of system leaders more than system leaders were successfully 
managing system dynamics. 
Throughout the evaluation,  local authorities and some funders, have grumbled, generally 
sotto voce, about the Safe Families’ Christian credentials. We find these concerns to be 
unfounded. That said, Safe Families is developing as an organisation’ and is learning 
about the priority and presentation of its values. It also has to learn about how to 
experiment to extend a model that has been successful in finding volunteers in the 
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Christian church to other faith and non-faith groups. As the evaluation came to an end, 
such experimentation was underway. 
Challenges 
Any start-up faces multiple challenges. Safe Families is no different. Here we focus 
mainly on 2: the difficulty of making the intervention a true alternative to local authority 
care, and of how to maintain continuity in scaling. 
DSRU has put a lot of stress on the potential for Safe Families to act as a viable 
alternative for about 15% of children separated into local authority care, the 4,500 
children aged 10 years or less entering under Section 20 of the Children Act 1989 in 
England each year. Some local authorities fail to see this potential. Maybe Safe Families 
is better used as part of a range of early help interventions. 
We suggest, though, that there is a need that can be met by Safe Families. The legal 
basis for using Safe Families as an alternative to care has been established. We have 
found a steady flow of 15% of children coming into care that meet the Safe Families’ 
eligibility criteria in all 20 local authorities. Safe Families has shown that it can support 
such families, without causing harm, and while producing high levels of satisfaction 
among primary carers.  
Second, many local authorities are under immense strain coping with budget cuts. By 
focusing on the populations that cause concern to elected members and senior staff, 
Safe Families can build its reputation. It can release pressure on local authorities, not 
least in the willingness it has shown to respond, in a timely way, to the Friday evening 
crisis when social workers have little time to think and few alternatives at hand. 
Third, in 3 years’ time, when local authority budgets are likely to be further reduced, it is 
likely that many will turn to the array of early help services when looking for cuts. A 
service aimed at children and families that the local authority must support has much 
greater chance of surviving an economic downturn. 
Fourth, innovation in this area is desperately needed. Safe Families represents much 
needed innovation. It shows others how to innovate on behalf of other groups of children 
coming into care. If Safe Families does not take on this task other organisations almost 
certainly will. 
If Category 2: Edge of Care is to be the focus, a number of obstacles will need to be 
surmounted. First, the matching between family and innovation must become adroit. 
Despite the limitations of the DSRU innovations described above, it seems almost certain 
that the remedy here will be technological, allied to high quality implementation. Second, 
Safe Families will need to continue to build its reputation as a safe pair of hands. Growth, 
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continued evaluation, and timely feedback to commissioners will help. Third, the 
confidence of Safe Families’ staff and volunteers will follow from the knowledge that they 
can support very needy families. Staff selection and supervision, continual reflection and 
growth, and a readiness to continually push back boundaries in a responsible manner will 
need to continue to be a part of the organisational values. 
Opinion favours Safe Families. Local authority senior leaders, elected members, and  
senior judges, are voicing concerns about the high numbers of children in care, and 
expressing concern about how best to support children. Alternatives are being sought. 
Safe Families will need to develop into an organisation that can address much of the 
problem in a professional manner without becoming another large voluntary organisation 
tied up in endless bureaucracy. 
The second challenge is scale. We have seen that there remains significant scope to 
scale Safe Families within its existing regional structure, an opportunity to serve more 
families in more local authorities from existing bases. At the same time, local authorities 
in new areas want to benefit from what Safe Families can do. Energy used in extending 
the geographical reach could undermine the potential in existing regions. 
It is not a matter of either/or. It is a matter of finding the right balance. Our experience in 
scaling innovations within public systems leads us to strongly urge Safe Families to 
develop a revised scaling strategy. The first iteration worked according to the textbook 
written by Rogers (1962). Conditions have now changed: a new guidebook is required. 
Conclusions 
The evaluation sought to answer 5 questions: 
First, does Safe Families divert the flow of children into foster and residential care by 
10%? We found that in most local authorities insufficient families were supported under 
Category 2 to achieve this goal, and that, in all local authorities, more needs to be done 
to reach the children referred to children’s services, especially those under the age of 10 
years, being accommodated for short periods under Section 20 of the Children Act 1989. 
When Safe Families reaches these children, it appears to divert them from the care 
system for extensive periods. We also found that benefits to local authorities will not be 
reaped without more attention to the management of system dynamics. 
Second, is there any evidence of increased stress on carers whose children are 
supported by Safe Families? We found no evidence of increased stress, but numbers in 
the trial part of the evaluation were insufficient to demonstrate impact. 
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Third, is there any evidence of impairment to the well-being of children supported by Safe 
Families? We found no evidence of impairment to the well-being of children, but again, 
low numbers in the trial limited confidence in findings. 
Fourth, does Safe Families reach needy families in a timely manner? The intervention is 
more timely than in the pre-innovation phase, but there is more room for improvement. 
Fifth, is the programme scaling in line with the Rogers’ (1962) strategy described above? 
It did scale according to the Rogers’ strategy, but a new strategy will be required to take 
the programme from 20 to 50 local authorities. 
In summary, we conclude that Safe Families represents one of the most adventurous 
start-ups in children’s services for some time. It has the potential to support several 
thousand of England’s neediest children; to greatly reduce the numbers of children in 
care, and to demonstrably forge a new relationship between public systems and civil 
society. There remain significant challenges, but Safe Families seems well set up to 
address them.  
Since the evaluation completed its data collection on entrants at the end of March 2016 
(we continued to collect follow-up data until the end of September 2016), Safe Families 
has grown further. Their own data sources suggest that just under 2,000 volunteers have 
now been approved, including over 600 ready to takein children for overnight stays. The 
number of families supported per month has risen from 17 to 92, and the number of bed 
nights offered from 31 to 141. A try, test, learn, and adapt approach has been approved 
for the task of diversifying volunteer recruitment. Demand for the innovation has spread 
across England and to other parts of the U.K. Governance arrangements are being 
tightened and child protection procedures continually improved. 
The next 18 months will be another critical phase in the organisation’s development. 
There is a possibility that Safe Families could be struggling to maintain the provision in 
the 20 local authorities it currently serves. By making the right choices, we can also 
envisage Safe Families operating in a third of English local authorities, clearly 
demonstrating positive impacts on children’s and carer’s well-being, and both cost 
savings and cost benefits to the public purse. We hope this evaluation will inform these 
decisions. 
Recommendations 
The initial scale up of Safe Families between January 2015 and March 2016 
demonstrates the potential to radically alter the way in which local authorities respond to 
children on the edge of care, forging a new relationship between public systems and civil 
society, and acting as a model for other reforms. However, as with all start-ups, there 
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remains much to learn, and challenges to overcome, before the potential of the 
innovation can be fully realised. Based on the evaluation results, DSRU recommends:  
1. While Safe Families can play a useful role in offering support for families whose 
children are not at risk of being accommodated in foster care, providing what local 
authorities call ‘early help’, the primary benefit of Safe Families comes from its 
provision of an alternative for about 15% of children who, each year, come into 
foster or residential care. The promise lies in benefits to children and families by 
exposing them to greater community support and less system involvement, and to 
the easing pressure on hard-pressed local authority budgets.  
2. If the first recommendation is accepted, we estimate that each year there are as 
many as 708 children on the edge of care in the 3 regions covered by Safe 
Families and within the 20 early adopter local authorities. Two-thirds of these 708 
children could be successfully diverted from foster or residential care. Extending 
Safe Families to 90% of local authorities in the existing 3 hub areas (meaning the 
innovation would serve 47 local authorities in total) could see it divert 1,533 
children from care annually. We therefore recommend that Safe Families favour 
consolidation in existing local authorities, and extending into new local authorities 
within existing regions over the development of new regions. These 2 options 
need not be mutually exclusive, it is a matter of balance.  
3. However, none of this potential can be realised unless Safe Families and user 
local authorities collaborate to ensure a good and timely match between the 
innovation and the families that can benefit from the innovation, that is,those 
whose reaction to a crisis means that their younger children are at risk of a short 
period of accommodation in care. We recommend finding a lasting solution to this 
challenge.  
4. The potential for local authorities to translate reductions in the flow of children into 
care into reduced numbers in care at any one time (or a reduction in overall bed 
nights) cannot be realised without them paying more attention to the management 
of system dynamics: that is, engaging local people and experts to choose a 
number that is right for local conditions; managing stock and flow; analysing the 
consequences of decisions at one point in the system for another. DSRU staff 
have been struck by the loss of knowledge about system dynamics within local 
authorities. We recommend that local authorities using Safe Families are given 
more access to training and tools to manage foster and residential care numbers 
at a level that is comfortable for elected members, the executive and senior 
practitioners.  
5. The evaluation suggests that Safe Families does no harm for the children it 
supports - the primary threshold for any innovation. However, the numbers in the 
trial are too low to indicate, with any confidence, the overall impact of Safe 
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Families on the stress levels of the primary carers - the catalyst for seeking 
support from children’s services - or on the well-being of children. We therefore 
recommend that the evaluation continue in as many user local authorities as 
possible. Mistakes were made by DSRU in the initial trial, and these need to be 
rectified in any future evaluation.  
6. No innovation should stand still. Others, in time, will build on Safe Families’ 
 and create new models. We recommend Safe Families undertakes a series of 
small experiments, varying the core model, for example to extend the programme 
to older adolescents, or to try to recruit volunteers from sources outside of the 
Christian church. If successful, such adaptations should be rolled out more widely.  
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Appendices 
Appendix 1: The Legal Status of Children Supported by Safe 
Families 
Safe Families supports 2 categories of children: 
 Category 1: those in need of family support, including short periods of respite 
away from the primary carer 
 Category 2: those on the edge of care, particularly those 10 years and under, 
whose mother asks the local authority to accommodate the children in foster or 
residential care under Section 20 of the Children Act, 1989 
During the course of the evaluation, as described in the main paper, the legal status of 
the children supported by Safe Families was questioned by 4 local authorities. One took 
the view that a child supported by Safe Families under Category 2 (on the edge of care) 
would do so under Section 20 of the 1989 legislation, with the same accountability that 
comes with a child placed in foster or residential care. A corollary for such an 
interpretation is that children supported by Safe Families under Category 2 would be 
counted in local authority returns for looked after children. 
DSRU and Safe Families both took the view that this interpretation, by a small number of 
local authorities, was wrong. Each organisation took advice from leading policy makers, 
academic and practising lawyers on the matter. Safe Families also put the question to the 
Department for Education. They appointed 2 independent inspectors (one a Director of 
Children’s Services, one an Ofsted inspector) to scrutinise the situation:their report is 
available on request. 
Our interpretation of that report, and as far as we can tell the interpretation of most local 
authorities, is that: 
 Category 1 cases are supported as a child in need. If the child spends a few nights 
with a host family, it does so under Section 17 of the Children Act, 1989. 
 Category 2 cases are supported under Section 17 of the Children Act, 1989. 
in practice, the primary carer, typically a mother, finds she is unable to cope, or that she 
has no-one to look after her children during an emergency - if she has to go into hospital, 
for example. She approaches her local children’s services. The social worker establishes 
the nature of the difficulty. In some local authorities, they direct the family to Safe 
Families and monitor the situation under Section 17 of the legislation, mindful of the short 
break guidance. In other local authorities, once it is clear the case meets the Section 20 
threshold, the social worker explains what Safe Families does and the mother agrees to 
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explore that option. Safe Families find they can support the mother and the children, and 
the mother and the children are happy with what Safe Families has to offer. The social 
worker sanctions the support under Section 17 of the 1989 legislation. 
There have been concerns that some local authorities have misused Section 17 by 
applying the legislation to people who take in their relatives’ children over an extensive 
period. One such person has taken a local authority to court, claiming she should be 
entitled to the same rights, including remuneration, as a foster parent. One of the local 
authorities involved in the evaluation asked Safe Families to take indemnity to cover legal 
costs, should one of their host families make the same claim. 
We believe that Safe Families is well placed to provide respite for children away from the 
family home under Section 17 of the Children Act, 1989, both in the spirit of the 
legislation and in law.  Each separation is short, wanted by the primary carer, seen as 
helpful by the local authority, and involves no payment to the family offering the respite. 
Essentially, we might think of this arrangement as one family in a community coming to 
the aid of another. What marks out a Safe Families host family from a foster parent is that 
the former takes in a child for at most 2 weeks in a year, and without any expectation of 
payment. 
Clearly, this situation would be different were the children to be supported by Safe 
Families for extensive periods of time. As set out in the main report, we do not believe 
Safe Families to be appropriate for all children coming into care, or indeed all those 
accommodated under Section 20. As the following appendix describes, most 
accommodated children are back home within weeks of separation. This is Safe Families’ 
catchment group, especially those aged 10 years and less. Although not legally required 
to do so, Safe Families has set a maximum of no more than 14 continuous nights of 
hosting, and no more than 28 nights for any one child in a calendar year, figures that tally 
with those for regulations of private fostering. 
A more cautious approach would be to count children supported under Category 2 of the 
Safe Families provision under Section 20 of the 1989 legislation. Section 20 brings with it 
a raft of obligations to the primary carer and child, such as duty to review; the need to 
approve carers as foster carers; and the regular visiting of the child by a local authority 
social worker. Safe Families’ hosting of children within Section 17 avoids this regulatory 
framework and the safeguards it is perceived to bring to children. It is  incumbent on local 
authorities that share our interpretation to apply Section 17 for the benefits it is seen as 
bringing to children and families, and not as a mechanism for avoiding the responsibilities 
that come with Section 20. 
Much of this is a matter of interpretation of the spirit of the 1989 legislation. The Act 
embodied a new settlement between state and family, giving parents and children more 
rights. A parent can ask the local authority to accommodate his or her children in foster or 
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residential care, but if he or she has a change of mind – whether just before placement, a 
day after separation, 6 weeks later, or whenever - the social worker must agree unless 
there are grounds to go to court and take the child into care under a care order. We are 
mindful writing these words that, prior to the 1989 Act, social workers could deny parents’ 
request for their children to return, by way of an administrative fiat, with no involvement of 
the courts. 
The numbers of children coming into care are rising. Given the increasing pressures  
being heaped on social workers not to err on matters of child protection or administration, 
it would be quite reasonable to exhort them to be cautious and exert more control over 
families, possibly, at times, resulting in a misapplication of Section 20 or an underuse of 
Section 17. At the same time, central government is asking local government to reduce 
expenditure and allow civil society to flourish. Finding the right balance is difficult, and 
should be subject to much more debate and experimentation:  for the moment, we 
believe the advice given in this appendix should guide Safe Families and user local 
authorities to find a good response to the needs of some children who otherwise would 
come into the foster care system. 
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Appendix 2: Statistics on Section 20 Cases 
In the design phase, we had to make some educated guesses about the proportion of 
children that would meet Safe Families thresholds for Category 2 Edge of Care. The data 
we used for this analysis also provides an indication of the average length of stay in 
foster or residential care for these cases: how many days are saved if Safe Families 
successfully diverts the cases from Section 20; and how many hosting nights Safe 
Families might reasonably be expected to offer if they are reaching those who really are 
on the edge of care. 
We have to go back to old data to find a study that follows a cohort of children coming 
into care over a 5 year period. The Lost in Care and Going Home studies by DSRU were 
based on 450 children entering care in 5 local authorities. Two-fifths of the entrants were 
voluntary receptions, and 3-quarters of them (n=204) are short-stay, meaning they were 
back with family within 6 months. This is the group most relevant to Safe Families. 
Over two-fifths (45%) of this group of short-stay voluntary receptions were aged 10 years 
or less. These 91 children represented about 20% of the 450 children coming into care. If 
we apply the hypothesis that Safe Families can successfully divert three-quarters of 
these children from care, then the overall benefit to each local authority would be 14% of 
all entrants not taking up foster or residential care beds. 
A more conservative estimate would factor in Safe Families’ commitment to support 
children away from home for no more than 14 nights in the year, a threshold that reduces 
the reach to 12% of all children coming into care with 8% overall being successfully 
diverted. 
 Taking the broader definition Safe Families would then be providing about 12.3 nights 
with a host family per child, or, taking the more conservative definition, about 4.4 nights 
per child, that is more than the 1.9 to 3 nights currently used by Category 2 Edge of Care 
cases. 
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